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Abstract
In this paper apriorism has been examined, the main-stream philosophy of economic science. An
essential element in apriorism is the idea that the economist should always start his analysis from
a hard, solid core of assumptions, in which he can have great confidence. Since most aprioristic
thinkers reflect to some extent the insights of Robbins, Menger and Mill, the latter have been
considered rather extensively. Menger and Mill have virtually the same arguments for their almost
identical hard core assumptions. It is partly a methodological argument: for a knowledge of the
consequence of the various motives influencing human action, we must first know the consequences
of each of these motives separately. Observation and/or introspection reveal to us what these motives
are. In economics this amounts to the hard core assumption of an economic man striving efficiently
towards his economic end. Robbins argues in a fundamentally different way, since his hard core
contains almost universal facts of experience, present whenever human activity has an economic
aspect. On the other had Mill and Robbins have almost identical views concerning the confrontation
of deduced results with reality and the value of economic predictions.
The aprioristic approach is said to disapprove of the usual practice of econometrics mainly
because the latter does not base its theory on a set of assumptions that can be considered as a hard
core within apriorism. The views of Robbins van Von Mises appear to confirm the idea that
apriorism is incompatible with this usual practice.
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1. Introduction
The mainstream philosophy of the economic science, at least until the fifties of the present century,
is apriorism, especially empirical apriorism. A great number of economists, when writing about their
philosophy of science, reveal ideas which are related to those of the Classical author John Stuart Mill
(1874), the Neo-Classical and Austrian author Carl Menger (1883) and Neo-Classicist Lionel R.
Robbins (1969). This applies, for example, to Senior (1938), Cairnes (1875), Dietzel (1895), J.N.
Keynes (1891) and Von Mises (1962). In section 5 and 6 this point is further developed. Therefore,
to understand apriorism it is useful to give a fairly extensive and precise sketch of the ideas of Mill,
Menger and Robbins. The sections 2, 3, and 4 are an attempt to do this, by trying to focus attention
on the arguments these writers give for their philosophies and to emphasize the restrictions they see
in the applicability of their ideas. In section 7 it turns out that the usual practice of econometric
practice does not fit within apriorism.
2. The Classical Philosophy of the Economic Science according to Mill
The title of Mill's essay, "On the Definition of Political Economy; and on the method of Investigation
Proper to It," emphasizes the important relation that, according to Mill, exists between this definition
and the appropriate method of analysis. The social sciences should concentrate on the "principles
of human nature which are peculiarly connected with the ideas and feelings generated in man by
living in a state of society."  Moreover he states: "When an effect depends on a concurrence of1
causes, those causes must be studied one at a time, and their laws separately investigated, if we wish
through the causes to obtain the power of either predicting or controlling the effect."  And: "In order2
to judge how he (i.e. man in society) will act under the variety of desires and aversions which are
currently operating upon him, we must know how he would act under the exclusive influence of each
one in particular."3
Given these statements Mill's description of the task of economics hardly contains a surprise.
Economics, as a branch of the social sciences, is concerned with man in society:
"solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, an who is capable of judging of the comparative
efficacy of means for obtaining that end. It predicts only such of the phenomena of the social state
as take place in consequence of the pursuit of wealth. It makes entire abstraction of every other
human passion or motive; except those which may be regarded as perpetually, antagonizing
principles to the desire of wealth, namely aversion to labour, and desire of the present enjoyment
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of costly indulgences."  4
The first of the sentences in this quotation is, in Mill's view, an accurate description of the
law of human nature whose consequences in various classes of circumstances economics has to
study, and from which this science has its solid starting point. One may of course wonder on what
grounds Mill bases this contention. In the first place he argues:
"The desires of man, and the nature of conduct to which they prompt him, are within the reach of
our observation. We can also observe what are the objects can principally collect within himself;
with reasonable consideration of the differences, of which experience disclose to him the existence,
between himself and others."  Hence introspection reveals the distinguishable desires: the pursuit5
of wealth is the subject for economics. The rest of Mill's argument follows from his conception of
what a social science should do.
So, all economic analysis should start from an economic man knowing his economic goal and
the relative efficiency of means to achieve it. This hard core is to be supplemented with assumptions
specifying classes of circumstances. Next, analytically implied consequences are to be deduced from
this conjunction of fundamental and specifying axioms. If the results of such specified theories are
to be confronted with reality one has to investigate, firstly, with which class of cases the particular
set of circumstances corresponds.6
Secondly, one has to investigate what other circumstances are apparent. These may or may
not "operate upon human conduct through the economic principle (i.e. law) of human nature"  If7
they do, one may consider whether they are of a sufficient general importance to supplement the
theory with additional specifying assumptions, or to replace some of the auxiliary assumptions, in
order to arrive at a revised and specialized theory. If they work through the laws of nature of other
social sciences, the case falls out the province of economics.  Economics is applicable only for those8
"departments of human affairs, in which the acquisition of wealth is the main and acknowledged
end."9
This conclusion must be supplemented in two aspects, both mainly originating in the
complexity of the circumstances. The first concerns prediction, and the second those cases in which
the acquisition of wealth is not the only main and acknowledged end. According to Mill, the social
sciences cannot be sciences of "positive predictions, but only of tendencies,"  because "observation10
in circumstances of complexity is apt to be imperfect."  The complexity arises from the11
"extraordinary number and variety of the data or elements - of the agents which, ..., co-operate
towards the effect."12
Hence one can only infer tendencies, i.e. one can only  conclude "from the laws of human
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nature applied to the circumstances of a given state of society, that a particular cause will operate
in a certain  manner unless counteracted."  If an effect depends on different laws of human nature13
one should consider "all the causes which conjunctly influence the effect and compound their laws
(i.e. of the different social sciences concerned) with one another."  In such a case the complexity14
problem of the circumstances may worsen in such a way that the confidence in the results of the
deduction process as well as in the comparison of these results with those observed "diminishes in
value, ..., in so rapid a ratio as soon to become entirely worthless."  In such instances Mill15
recommends that one postulates laws "conjecturally from specific experience, and afterwards
connect then with the principles of human nature by a priori reasonings, which reasonings are thus
a real verification."  Mill refers to this method as the inverse, deductive method.  16 17
To summarize Mill's philosophy of science one can proceed as follows. Each of the branches
of the social sciences should study the consequences of one law of human nature, considered in
isolation. The formation of theories in a social science exists in the development of conclusions
analytically correctly deduced from a set of axioms, This set has a hard core, existing of the law of
human nature of the particular social science concerned. In economics this fundamental postulate
states that the sole end of mankind is to acquire wealth and that he knows the relative efficiency of
means to achieve that end. Mill's definition of the task of economics contains this postulate.
Economics should analyse the consequences of the fundamental axiom in various classes of
circumstances. Two arguments, basically, defend this definition. Firstly, Mill sees it as the best way
to understand and explain social effects. For we should know the effect of each law separately before
we are able to explain an effect from a conjunction of laws. Secondly, observation, but principally
introspection, teaches what the different laws of human nature are; hence, also the economic law of
nature. The fundamental axiom has to be supplemented with assumptions, describing classes of
specific circumstances, which influence the outcome of the analysis. Economists should develop
specialized theories concerning relevant (i.e. sufficiently general ) classes  of circumstances.
Predictions can only be made in a conditioned sence, i.e. if the auxiliary assumptions remain close
enough to the circumstances of the particular case.
A posteriori confrontation of a specialized theory with the facts may indicate replacement
or supplementation of the auxiliary assumptions. It may also suggest that other laws of human nature
are involved. Then, one may consider combining the expertise concerning the principles of human
nature involved in an effort to analyse their compound effects. Such analysis rapidly becomes too
difficult a task, because of the complicating influence of the auxiliary axioms specifying the
circumstances. Then, Mill recommends the use of the "inverse deductive" instead of the "concrete
deductive" method.
3. Neo-Classical and early Austrian Philosophy of Economic Science according to Menger
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According to Menger theoretical science has and must have an exact and an empirically realistic
branch.  These branches differ in two aspects, namely the amount of abstraction and the nature of18
the involved laws. In the empirically  realistic branch one starts the analysis from "real types" These
types describe the typical, characterizing features of the real phenomema. Within this there is some
room for peculiarities.  The empirical laws related to these "real types" are to be arrived at by19
observation of the regularities in subsequence and coexistence of the real phenomena. Menger sees
as the most important property of this kind of laws, that they cannot be guaranteed to hold without
exception . However, exact laws which hold without exception can be obtained by the exact method20
of theoretical science. The task of the exact social science is, as Menger states it, to analyze "the
phenomena of mankind from the most original and most fundamental forces and motives, and to
investigate to what effects each basic, separate motive of human nature leads in a completely free
behaviour not restricted by any factors, particularly not by error, ignorance of the situation or
external compulsion."  In this way we obtain a series of social theories: each taken apart gives only21
one aspect of human behaviour; taken together however they allow us to understand social
behaviour.  Exact economics has to analyze the consequences of a very important motive, that of22
human self interest in its striving to satisfy its needs for goods in complete freedom and with full
knowledge of all relevant facts.  The exact mode of inquiry is to be based on "strict types",23
describing the strictly typical elements of the realities. For economics Menger lists as "strict types":
the human needs for goods, goods directly offered by nature, including means of production, and the
pursuit of the highest satisfaction of these needs.  Exact laws are related to these "strict types".24
Menger's philosophy concerning the exact social sciences is obviously related to Mill's
concrete deductive method. They use virtually  identical arguments for the assumptions from which
each instance of economic analysis has its solid starting point. First, one should analyze each
tendency of human nature, taken in isolation. Then one should put them together to arrive at a full
understanding of social behaviour. Economics is concerned with a very important motive, described
in the solid core assumptions. These axioms are also very much alike for both authors. Mill defines
his economic man "as a being who desires to possess wealth and who is capable of judging the
comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end."  Menger's economic man strives to satisfy25
his needs for goods in complete freedom and with full knowledge. Mill is willingly to confront the
deduced results of an economic theory, specified with auxiliary assumptions with reality in cases
where the economic end is the main and acknowledged one. At the same time he suggests that this
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is an important and large class of cases.  Menger is hardly prepared to confront the theoretical26
results with reality, being convinced that a theory with his hard core, economic man assumption
accords with full reality only in very rare cases.  He classifies testing of exact theories against reality27
as a denial of the basic principles of the exact method.  "Nothing is so certain" as Menger puts it28
"that the results of exact analysis seem ... unrealistic to the norms of reality."29
Menger thinks that this distinction of an exact and an empirically realistic branch applies to all
sciences. To illustrate this point he states, as an example, that chemistry postulates the unempirical
laws that elements and their compounds exist in their full purity and that they are identical in their
real phenomena for all times and places.  Furthermore it is to be emphasized, in the most explicit30
way possible, that Menger warns against a one-sided use of only the exact method.  In his view the31
finding of empirically realistic laws is of great importance for the prediction and the control of
phenomena in the real economy.  In this context he adds that the more complex the situation is, the32
more difficult the application of the  exact method is.  So, again we find a parallel idea with Mill,.33
He also sees application of the concrete deductive method as a more difficult task in more complex
situations. Moreover, Menger's empirically realistic method obtains empirical laws in the same way
as Mill's inverse deductive method. But since, in Menger's view, empirical laws can never be
guaranteed to hold without exception, he cannot see Mill's connective reasoning to the principles of
human nature as a verifying procedure.
Menger strongly criticizes the view of the Historical School.  According to the adapts of this34
School the economic phenomena should be studied in an inseparable relation with the social and
political (staatlichen) development of the peoples.  Economics should not start its analysis from an35
unrealistic economic man assumption, because in reality many, sometimes conflicting, motives lead
human action. Menger acknowledge this principle as guideline for a historic understanding. History
should teach all aspects of all phenomena.  As already pointed out above, they should study the36
consequences of each basic human motive in isolation, whereas a universal, full understanding of
the social phenomena can only be obtained by a conjunction of social sciences. Moreover, the real
types and the empirical laws of the realistic method also abstract from full reality. Without
abstraction, one cannot obtain any law, as Menger puts it.  But empirical laws related to specified37
real types are, of course, influenced by the context of law morality, etc., within the real types
concerned have been observed. Hence, Menger considers an attempt to imply non-economic factors
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in the empirically realistic branch as superfluous.38
In this connection a final note may be made. The critique of the Historical School did not and
does not find considerable momentum among economists. Hereto one can add that the work related
to this School. "has, abstracted from a few exceptions, been stuck into the collection of empirical
data, of which the theoretical processing was postponed to a distant future. When they tried a
theoretical reasoning, they usually used the just heavily criticized principles of the common abstract
theories."39
4. Neo-Classical Philosophy of Economic Science according to Robbins
Robbins also emphatically deals with the definition of the task of economics.  As in the cases of40
Mill and Menger the resulting concept is closely related to his philosophy of science.  Economics41
has, as Robbins posits it, to analyze human behaviour purposively directed to given ends with given
scarce means, which have alternative uses.  Scarcity "means limitation in relation to demand."  He42 43
stresses the "economics is entirely neutral between ends" and "to speak of end as being itself
"economic" is entirely misleading."  As is rather obvious this definition of the task of economics44
differs from the ones given by Mill and Menger.  45
In Mill's concept there is clearly an economic end: the desire to possess wealth. This also
applies to Menger, for whom the fullest attainment of satisfaction with goods is the economic
motive. Hence, Robbins does not consider economics that part of the social sciences that
concentrates on the economic motive, and abstracts from the other human desires, as Mill and
Menger do. Furthermore, his definition does not imply the assumption of fully efficient or
completely rational use of the given means to achieve the given end, whereas Mill and Menger
assume something that is very much akin to this economic principle. It only implies purposive
action. . So it is to be noted that Robbins' description of the task of economics does not contain his46
hard core assumptions, the consequences of which the economist has to analyze in various cases.
This task, however, is precisely the nature of economic analysis as he sees it. That nature
consists "of deductions from a series of postulates,the chief of which are almost universal facts of
experience  present whenever human activity  has an economic aspect, the rest being assumptions
of a more limited nature based upon the general features of particular situations which the theory
Ibid., p. 99-100.47
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is to be used to explain".  Obviously this proposition is by and large in agreement with the47
philosophies of Menger and Mill. The subsidiary postulates regard "the condition of markets, the
number of parties to the exchange, the state of the law, the minimum sensible of buyers and sellers,
and so on."  So these auxiliary assumptions "may be drawn from "historico-relative material"".48 49
This does not apply for the main, hard core assumptions.  Robbins lists as examples of these50
universal axioms:
- "the different things that the individual wants to do have a different importance to him, and
can be arranged therefore in a certain order."51
- the law of diminishing returns, i.e. the increase of the amount of one factor of production
without increasing the amounts of the others leads to a less than proportional increase of the
product.52
- the uncertainty  with regard to the future availability of scarce good and scarce factors.53
- the existence of indirect change.54
As a third kind of premises Robbins adds "approximative" assumptions such as perfect rationality
and perfect foresight "which are introduced into economic analysis at various stages of
approximation of reality."  The purpose of this kind of assumption is "to enable us to study, in55
isolation, tendencies which, in the world of reality, operate in conjunction with many others, and
then, by contrast as much as by comparison, to turn back to apply the knowledge thus gained to the
explanation of more complicated situations."  So. although Robbins rejects the economic principle56
(since he list as universal axiom the uncertainty with regard to the future availability of scarce good
and scarce factors), he allows assumptions of this (third) kind as intermediate steps towards full
reality. This point of view clearly differs with the insights of Menger and Mill. However it must be
stated that Robbins does not elaborate on this, e.g. how these approximations must be improved and
how the obtained results relate to other sciences.
With regard to the confrontation of the conclusions of the deducted results with reality
Robbins identifies three functions:57
- a check on the applicability of different types of theoretical constructions to given situations.
- the suggestion of the auxiliary postulates.
- the exposure of area where pure theory needs to be reformulated and extended.
From given data the predictions of the economic law follow logically and inevitably. So, is the
 Ibid., p.12358
Ibid., p. 125.59
Ibid., esp. p. 63-70.60
Ibid., p. 114-116.61
Ibid., p. 108.62
So "empirical apriorism" in our context differs in meaning from Klant's, see esp. his p. 88.63
See page 12 and 13 above.64
circumstances and the auxiliary assumptions correspond, then the deduced conclusions are inevitable
predictions. But, of course "if the data change, the consequences predicted do not necessarily
follow."  Moreover, as Robbins adds:"the very fact that events in the large are uncontrolled, that58
the fringe of given data is so extensive and so exposed to influence form unexpected quarters, must
take the task of prediction, however carefully safeguarded, extremely hazardous."  These insights,59
regarding prediction and the confrontation of theory with reality, coincide largely with Mill's ideas.
Although Robbins acknowledges the value of applied economics related to index data for
certain practical purposes, he emphasizes that the conclusions, thus obtained, do not follow from the
laws of pure theory.  Moreover, he states very explicitly that attempts to obtain quantitative laws60
will not lead to results of a permanent value: not one quantitative law of permanent value has
emerged, not in the studies of the Historical School, not by the Institutionalists and not from the
applications of modern statistical techniques by adepts of the "orthodox" theoretical analysis.  They61
may, however, provide some guideline for short term predictions.62
5. Comparison of Mill, Menger and Robbins 
It may be useful to list a few key-words to characterize the essential features of the philosophies of
science which have been discusses so far. These concepts are: economic end, efficient action,
empirical, exact and apriorism. "Economic end" means here that the author concerned believes that
it possible to define an economic end. "Efficient action" refers to postulates assuming that human
action, directed to given ends, is capable of striving after these ends in an efficient way. The
predicate "empirical" refers to the idea that the results of economic analysis should be applied and
confronted with reality in a way described for Mill and Robbins in the sections 2 and 4.  The63
adjective "exact" indicates Menger's view that the results of exact economic analysis should not be
tested against reality. Finally "apriorism" stands for the idea that all economic analysis should start
from a basic set of axioms, a hard core in which the economist can have great confidence,
supplemented with auxiliary assumptions specifying classes of circumstances.
With these concepts Mill's concrete deductive method can be characterized as "empirical
apriorism", in which the hard core of an economic end and efficient action exists. The exact method
of Menger can be referred to as "exact apriorism" with the same hard core. Robbins' philosophy can
be called "empirical apriorism", in which the universal axioms do not include an economic end and
efficient action. He only assumes "purposive action" and lists four other basic axioms.64
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6. Related views
A great number of authors have ideas which can be conceived of as a kind of mixture of those of
Robbins and Mill. This applies, for example, to Senior, Cairnes, Dietzel, J.N. Keynes and Von
Mises. Senior lists four "elementary", hard core, assumptions. The first of these implies "efficient
action".  Cairnes reports two "paramount mental principles", implying an economic end and65
efficient action. Moreover he also points out two kinds of subsidiary  axiom. Of these two kinds an
economist should always use one in some specified form. They relate to propensities, determining
the laws of population, and to the physical qualities of the soil and other natural agents.  Dietzel66
distinguishes between psychological "hard core" premisses and social "subsidiary" postulates. The
first two of his three psychological assumptions state an economic end and efficient action
respectively. As general "hard core" assumptions of J.N. Keynes one may list "the principle that men
desire to increase their sum of satisfactions with the smallest possible sacrifice to themselves, the
law of decreasing final utility as amount of commodity increases, the law of diminishing return from
the land, and the like," ...  As less general subsidiary assumptions he denotes the alternative67
hypotheses of free competition and pure monopoly. For the combination of all the assumptions he
requires that all the phenomena at the period and place to which the investigator has primary
reference"  be included. So, apart form the hard core the theory must contain adequate auxiliary68
assumptions.
The next section focuses attention upon the Neo-Austrian insights of Von Mises.
7. Neo-Austrian Philosophy of Economic Science according to Von Mises
 Finally, there is Von Mises. In order to demonstrate that he also belongs to the empirical apriorists,
he will be discussed slightly more extensively.  Von Mises sees economics as a part of praxeology.69
This theoretical science is concerned with human action. To act means "to strive after ends, that is
to choose a goal and to resort to means in order to attain the goal sought" or: "Action is purposive
conduct. It is not simply behaviour but begot by judgements of value, aiming at a definite end and
guided by ideas concerning the suitability of definite means."  This purposive action should be done70
so that "no less urgently desired end should be satisfied if its satisfaction prevents the attainment of
a more urgently desired end."  economics is, according to Von Mise, the only elaborated branch of71
praxeology and deals "with all market phenomena, in all their aspects."  72
It is remarkable that the task Von Mises sees for praxeology coincides very much with the
task Robbins defines for economics. So, economics in Von Mises' sense may have a narrower scope.

Ibid., p. 65-66.73
Ibid., p. 44.74
Ibid., p. 65.75
Ibid., p. 65.76
See Robbins (1969), p. 112.77
See Von Mises (56),p. 63.78
Ibid., p. 83.79
Whatever the case may be, economics in Robbins' sense can clearly be conceived of as a part of, or
as identical to, Von Mises' praxeology. And their philosophies of science have more in common. It
is obvious that Von Mises' description of purposive action implies Robbins ordered preferences
assumption. Von Mises also emphasizes the uncertainty of the future,  which is Robins third basic73
postulate. Moreover Von Mises acknowledges the auxiliary assumptions, as he states: "Into the chain
of praxeology reasoning, the praxeologist introduces certain assumptions concerning the condition
of the environment in which an action takes place. Then he tries to find out how these question
whether or not the real conditions of the external world correspond to these assumptions is to be
answered by experience."  Notable related views also concern prediction. Von Mises states "the74
predictions of praxeology are, within the range of their applicability, absolutely certain."  But the75
vale judgements concerning the ends of human action may change in the future, so it cannot be
known in advance whether the anticipation of these future value judgements base on specific
historical understanding will be correct.  So, it turns out that one need not hesitate placing Von76
Mises within the framework of empirical apriorism.
The opinions of Robbins and Von Mises, who are aware of modern macro-econometric
practice, confirm this view. We refer to the end of section 4 with regard to Robbins and quote him
here: "In the last ten years there has been a great multiplication of this sort of thing under the name
of Institutionalism, "Quantitative Economics," "Dynamic Economics," and what not, yet most of the
investigation has been doomed to infertility from the outset and might just as well never haven been
undertaken ... Averages are taken of phenomena occurring under the most heterogeneous
circumstances of time and space, and the result is expected to have significance."77
In various places Von Mises is rather explicit on this matter: "As a method of economic
analysis econometrics is a childish play with figures that does not contribute anything to the
elucidation of the problems of economic reality."  And about macroeconomics: "The authors who78
think that they have substituted in the analysis of the market economy a macroeconomic approach
for what they disdain as the spurious individualistic approach delude themselves and their public."79
8. Summary
In this paper apriorism has been examined, the main-stream philosophy of economic science. An
essential element in apriorism is the idea that the economist should always start his analysis from
a hard, solid core of assumptions, in which he can have great confidence. Since most aprioristic
thinkers reflect to some extent the insights of Robbins, Menger and Mill, the latter have been
considered rather extensively. Menger and Mill have virtually the same arguments for their almost

identical hard core assumptions. It is partly a methodological argument: for a knowledge of the
consequence of the various motives influencing human action, we must first know the consequences
of each of these motives separately. Observation and/or introspection reveal to us what these motives
are. In economics this amounts to the hard core assumption of an economic man striving efficiently
towards his economic end. Robbins argues in a fundamentally different way, since his hard core
contains almost universal facts of experience, present whenever human activity has an economic
aspect. On the other had Mill and Robbins have almost identical views concerning the confrontation
of deduced results with reality and the value of economic predictions.
The aprioristic approach is said to disapprove of the usual practice of econometrics mainly
because the latter does not base its theory on a set of assumptions that can be considered as a hard
core within apriorism. The views of Robbins van Von Mises appear to confirm the idea that
apriorism is incompatible with this usual practice.

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